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A Snake Eating Its Own Tail: The Self-Defeating
Nature of an Overly Broad Implementation of Section
1071
I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses are the backbone of their communities.1 These
businesses are vital in fueling economic growth and fostering community
development.2 They are the primary source of income for many owners
and employees.3 Their successes and failures send ripple effects though
their economies.4
For small businesses to succeed, they need reliable access to
5
credit. Community banks have “consistently served as a dedicated and
essential source of credit to small firms” 6 and have proven to be the best
and most reliable source of credit to these small businesses. 7 When
community banks suffer, so do small businesses and the communities

1. Gregg Fairbrothers & Catalina Gorla, Social Value and Core Value: Small Businesses
and Local Communities, FORBES (July 5, 2012, 11:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/site
s/greggfairbrothers/2012/07/05/social-value-and-corevalue-small-businesses-and-localcommunities/#20ab0bb3424e.
2. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. B UREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS OF THE SMALL BUSINESS
LENDING LANDSCAPE 3 (May 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2017
05_cfpb_Key-Dimensions-Small-Business-Lending-Landscape.pdf (“Small businesses play
a key role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally
and in their local communities.”).
3. See id. (“64 percent of respondents stated that their small business was their primary
source of income.”).
4. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to Preserve
the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 249, 297 (2015).
5. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“To contribute meaningfully
to the U.S. economy, small businesses – and especially women-owned and minority-owned
small businesses – need access to credit to smooth business cash flows from current operations
and to allow entrepreneurs to take advantage of opportunities for growth.”).
6. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 288; See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra
note 2, at 24 (stating that small businesses continue to rely on traditional financial institutions,
defined as large banks and small banks, as their primary source of financing).
7. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24–25 (explaining that 46% of
small businesses who applied for credit did so at a small community bank, 22% of small
businesses rely on community banks as their primary source of credit, and small businesses
are more likely to be approved for credit by a community bank than a larger bank).
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they serve. 8 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has
begun the rulemaking process for Section 1071 (“Section 1071”) of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”), which could threaten community banks by imposing additional
burdensome compliance costs related to small business lending. 9
Section 1071 amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(“ECOA”) to require financial institutions to compile, maintain, and
report information concerning credit applications made by womenowned, minority-owned, and small businesses. 10 In May 2017, the CFPB
took its first major step in the rulemaking process for Section 1071 by
issuing a request for information (“RFI”) on the small-business lending
marketplace. 11 The RFI seeks to collect information which will help
explore potential ways to implement Section 1071 in a balanced manner
with a goal of providing timely data with the highest potential for
achieving the statutory objectives of facilitating enforcement of fair
lending laws, while minimizing burden to both the industry and CFPB.12
The most fundamental goal of Section 1071 is to protect small
businesses. 13 An overly broad application, however, could be selfdefeating and ultimately hinder these same small businesses. 14 If the
implementation of Section 1071 imposes too heavy of a compliance cost
burden, it may cause the community banks to fail, thereby restricting
access to credit for small businesses—the very businesses this law was
enacted to protect. 15 In order to better achieve the regulatory goals of
Section 1071 while not imposing undue compliance burdens on
community banks, the CFPB should exercise its statutory exemption
authority to exempt community banks with less than $50 million in assets.
8. See Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1 (explaining that employees and their families
depend on small businesses and that communities crumble without the revenue flows from
these small businesses).
9. See Jeff Bater, CFPB Starts Inquiry of Small-Business Lending, [2017] Banking
Daily (BNA) No. 90 (May 11, 2017) [hereinafter Bater, Inquiry].
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1071(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(b) (2016).
11. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg.
22318 (May 10, 2017).
12. Id. at 22319.
13. See id. (stating that a goal of Section 1071 is to identify small business needs and
opportunities).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part IV; see also Request for Information Regarding the Small Business
Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. at 22318 (explaining that a fundamental goal of Section 1071
is to identify small business needs and opportunities).
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This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II describes the goals of
Section 1071 and the issues to be addressed by the rulemaking process. 16
Part III examines the importance of small businesses to the economy. 17
Part IV explains how an overbroad implementation could cause
community banks to exit the market and harm the small businesses that
the rule was enacted to protect. 18 Part V suggests that the smallest
community banks be exempted from the implementation of Section 1071
and explains how the exemption would save small community banks
from significant new compliance costs.19 Finally, Part VI concludes by
summarizing how an overly broad application of Section 1071 could
harm community banks and the potential for the suggested exemption to
mitigate those potential harms. 20
II. THE GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1071
Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, lenders were prohibited from
collecting race and gender data in connection with nonmortgage
lending.21 On July 16, 2007, three congressmen wrote a letter to the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to ask for a review of the
impact of ending this prohibition.22 The letter also asked the GAO to
assess the possible costs of requiring banks to collect and report this type
of information and review the advantages and disadvantages to banks and
small businesses of amending the rule. 23 This was the beginning of the
process of developing a rule that was eventually passed in Dodd-Frank in
the form of Section 1071.24

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Richard Cowden, Lawmakers Question Fed Ban on Collecting Race, Gender Data
for NonMortgage Lending, [2007] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 137 (July 18, 2007).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) § 1071, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2016) (enacting a final statute in the form of Section
1071).
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The Purposes of Section 1071

The stated purpose of Section 1071 is “to facilitate enforcement
of fair lending laws and enable communities, governmental entities, and
creditors to identify business and community development needs and
opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, and small
businesses.”25 The aims of Section 1071 can be summarized into two
main goals: (1) to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws, 26 and (2) to
compile reliable and consistent data on the small business lending market
that can be used by a variety of decision makers to assess problems in the
market and develop solutions. 27 The goals of Section 1071 should also
be viewed in light of the overall purposes of Dodd-Frank, which is to
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to
fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices,” among other
things.28
B.

The Requirements of Section 1071

Section 1071 seeks to accomplish its goals by requiring financial
institutions to compile and maintain records of information provided by
loan applicants regarding their status as women-owned, minority-owned,
or a small business.29 To gather this information, in the case of any
application for credit, a financial institution must inquire whether the
business is a women-owned, minority-owned, or small business and

25. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a).
26. Id.
27. See Testimony of Elizabeth Warren Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t

Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (“Congress intended Section 1071 to produce reliable and
consistent data that can be analyzed by the Bureau, other government agencies, and members
of the public to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws and to identify business and
community development needs.”).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2016) (stating in the preamble that the purpose of Dodd-Frank is
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
other purposes”).
29. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(b) (explaining that Section 1071
requires financial institutions to compile and maintain records of information provided by
loan applicants regarding their status as a women-owned, minority-owned, or small business).
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maintain a record of the responses. 30 Although any applicant may refuse
to provide any requested information, 31 each financial institution will be
required to compile and maintain a record of such information provided
by applicants in a manner to be prescribed by the CFPB. 32 Information
that must be collected includes (1) the number of applications, (2) the
purpose and amount of the credit applied for, (3) whether the application
was approved, (4) the location of the business, (5) the gross annual
revenue of the business, and (6) the race, sex, and ethnicity of the owners
of the business as well as any additional data the CFPB deems
necessary.33 The information collected must then be submitted to the
CFPB.34 In addition, the information compiled and maintained must be
retained for three years and made available to any member of the public
upon request. 35 Such information will also be made available to the
public generally each year by the CFPB. 36 Public dissemination of
information will enable communities, governmental entities, creditors,
and other interested parties to determine whether the needs and
opportunities of the community are being met and provide evidence on
which to pursue fair lending claims similar to how Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data has been used for decades. 37 The
CFPB’s new leadership should continue on the path to implementing
Section 1071 because a final rule could be crucial to furthering important

30. See id. (“Subject to the requirements of this section, in the case of any application to
a financial institution for credit for women-owned, minority-owned, or small business, the
financial institution shall— (1) inquire whether the business is a women-owned, minorityowned, or small business . . . .”).
31. Dodd-Frank § 1071(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(c).
32. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(1).
33. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(2) (requiring that collected
information must be itemized to clearly show certain information such as the number of
applications, the purpose and amount of the credit applied for, whether the application was
approved, the location of the business, the gross annual revenue of the business, and the race,
sex, and ethnicity of the owners of the business).
34. Dodd-Frank § 1071(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(f)(1).
35. Dodd-Frank § 1071(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(f)(2).
36. Id.
37. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a).
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policy goals.38 However, to be successful in achieving those goals, the
implementation must not be overbroad and self-defeating. 39
C.

Issues to be Addressed in the Rulemaking Process

Section 1071 leaves open several issues to be addressed by CFPB
regulations. 40 The CFPB will prescribe rules and issue guidance for
carrying out and enforcing the statutory requirements of Section 1071
through the rulemaking process. 41 Under Section 1071, the CFPB is to
issue regulations as to the manner in which financial institutions shall
compile and maintain a record of the information received from loan
applicants.42 The CFPB is also responsible for determining whether there
is any additional information that would be helpful in fulfilling the
purposes of Section 1071, implementing regulations requiring such
information to be collected, and issuing guidance to facilitate compliance
with the rule. 43 Perhaps the most significant issue to be addressed in the
rulemaking process is whether the CFPB will exercise its authority to
allow exceptions to or exemptions from Section 1071. 44 Congress has
given the CFPB the authority to adopt exceptions to any requirement and
may exempt any financial institution or class of financial institutions from
the requirements if it deems such exemptions necessary or appropriate. 45

38. See Dodd-Frank § 1071, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (explaining that the goals of Section
1071 are “to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws and enable communities,
governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community development needs
and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses” and that it seeks
to accomplish these goals by requiring financial institutions to compile and maintain records
of information provided by loan applicants regarding their status as a women-owned,
minority-owned, or small business).
39. See infra Part IV (explaining how an overbroad implementation of Section 1071
could be self-defeating).
40. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(1) (“The Bureau shall
prescribe such rules and issue such guidance as may be necessary to carry out, enforce, and
compile data pursuant to this section.”); See infra Part V (discussing why the CFPB should
use its exemption authority to exempt certain community banks from the requirements of
Section 1071).
41. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(1) (“The Bureau shall
prescribe such rules and issue such guidance as may be necessary to carry out, enforce, and
compile data pursuant to this section.”).
42. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(1).
43. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(2)(H), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(2)(H), (g)(3).
44. Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(2).
45. Id.
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The RFI also raises several issues that the CFPB seeks to address
in its rulemaking process.46 Perhaps the most important issue to be
addressed, and the primary focus of this Note, is the rule’s imposition of
additional compliance costs on an already highly-regulated industry, 47
and whether the CFPB will use its exemption or exception authorities to
lighten the burdens imposed by the rule. 48 Through the RFI process, the
CFPB is seeking information about the potential costs and complexity of
imposing these small business data collections and reporting
requirements. 49 Some in the industry have expressed concern in response
to the RFI that Section 1071 may become an onerous compliance burden
that could stifle cost-cutting and other initiatives that have helped small
businesses access capital. 50
The CFPB must also determine the appropriate definition of
“small business” for which to apply the requirements of Section 1071. 51
Section 1071 defines “small businesses” as having “the same meaning as
‘small business concern’ in Section 632” of the Small Business Act, 52
which authorizes the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to set size
standards for the definition. 53 Using the North American Industry
Classification System (“NAICS”), the SBA defines revenue-based or

46. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. 22318, 22319 (May 10, 2017) (explaining that the CFPB is seeking answers to five main
questions through the RFI process, regarding the definition of “small business,” which data
points should be compiled, which financial institutions are engaged in business lending,
access to credit and financial products offered to businesses, and privacy concerns).
47. See infra Part IV.
48. See infra Part V.
49. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 22318.
50. See Bater, Inquiry, supra note 9 (“Talbot told Bloomberg BNA the ETA is concerned
that the effort to collect data ‘could morph into onerous, premature restrictions that
unnecessarily stifle cost-cutting and time saving innovations that have helped small
businesses access capital.”); see also Comment letter from Lilly Thomas, Senior Vice
President, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of America, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2017-0011-0547 (urging the CFPB to provide relief from the potential
compliance costs of Section 1071 in the form of an exemption for community banks).
51. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 22319 (explaining that the CFPB is seeking input regarding the appropriate definition
of “small business”).
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1071(h)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(h)(2) (2016).
53. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 22319.
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employee-based size standards for each industry. 54 For its employeebased size standard, businesses in most industries with fewer than 500
employees are considered small businesses, with other industries having
different thresholds. 55 For its revenue-based size standard, the cutoff for
small businesses is typically around $7.5 million in average annual
receipts, with that number varying based on industry. 56 Through the
rulemaking process, however, the CFPB is exploring alternative
definitions of “small business” tailored to the needs and goals of Section
1071.57
Another important issue to be addressed by the CFPB is how the
information collected pursuant to Section 1071 will be used. 58
Considering the stated purpose of Section 1071—”to facilitate
enforcement of fair lending laws” 59—some financial institutions believe
the Bureau may use the data collected to pursue fair lending enforcement
cases. 60
The other stated purpose—to “enable communities,
governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community
development needs and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned,
and small businesses”—suggests that the data may primarily be for the
use of other entities to diagnose problems and assess opportunities in the
market.61 Experts have noted that the main benefit of collecting this data
would be to fill a gap where there is a lack of information about access to
credit for small businesses, and women-owned and minority-owned
businesses in particular.62

54. 13 C.F.R. § 21.201 (2017); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE
STANDARDS 1 (2004), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pd
f; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 5–6 (explaining the SBA’s system for
small business classification).
55. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 6.
56. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9.
57. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 22319.
58. See Victoria Finkle, CFPB Turns Attention to Small Business Lending Market, [2016]
Banking Daily (BNA) No. 119 (Jun. 21, 2016) (“For traditional banks and online lenders,
questions remain about what regulators intend to do with the information they ultimately
gather.”).
59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a) (2016).
60. See Finkle, supra note 58 (“Financial institutions are already bracing for the
possibility of fair lending enforcement cases, and some worry that the agency could explore
additional ways to oversee business lending activities.”).
61. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a).
62. Finkle, supra note 58.
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III. THE SMALL BUSINESSES LENDING MARKET AND ITS IMPORTANCE
TO THE ECONOMY
Small businesses play a key role in community development and
economic growth in their local economies and, in the aggregate, affect
the national economy. 63 Women-owned and minority-owned businesses
are a significant component of the small business world, with 97.7% of
all minority-owned businesses and 98.3% of all minority-owned
businesses falling under the SBA revenue-based size standard definition
of “small business.”64 They are critical to an innovative and dynamic
economy. 65 Firms with fewer than 500 employees have created two out
of every three jobs since 1993 and provide work for almost half of all
employees.66 Studies indicate that businesses with fewer than ten
employees that had access to credit were three times more likely to create
jobs than those with ten or more employees. 67 Areas with high
percentages of their workforce employed by small businesses show
positive trends in local incomes, employment rates, and poverty rates. 68
When small businesses are in decline, local economies struggle, local
government revenue declines, and unemployment rises. 69 These declines
are more likely to occur in environments where small businesses have
difficulty accessing credit. 70

63. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and
in their local communities.”).
64. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9.
65. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 10 (“Small businesses are critical
to an innovative and dynamic economy, no matter how they are defined.”).
66. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 10–11 (“Small businesses, when
defined as having fewer than 500 employees, provide work for almost half of all employees
in the private sector. Estimates suggest these businesses have created two out of every three
jobs since 1993.”).
67. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17.
68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 11.
69. See Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1 (“When small to mid-sized businesses shut
down, the losses to the economy, especially the local economy, can be lasting and profound
. . . [e]mployees may experience prolonged unemployment and costly relocation, and local
economies and local government revenues can be severely affected.”).
70. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“To contribute meaningfully
to the U.S. economy, small businesses – and especially women-owned and minority-owned
small businesses – need access to credit to smooth business cash flows from current operations
and to allow entrepreneurs to take advantage of opportunities for growth.”).
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The small business lending market is comprised of a few main
types of financial institutions offering various financial products. 71 The
vast majority of loans to small businesses originate from traditional
financial institutions, including community banks, and to a lesser extent,
credit unions and alternative lenders. 72 Community banks have long been
the most reliable provider of credit for small businesses even in times of
banking crises. 73 The most common financial products offered to small
businesses are lines of credit, term loans, and business credit cards in
addition to other forms such as trade credit provided by retailers or
wholesalers, factoring, and advances for future receipts. 74
Many small businesses have faced difficulty obtaining credit
since the financial crisis.75 Access to credit is vital for small businesses
not only to grow, but also to ensure smooth cash flow for current
operations.76 A SBA study shows a strong correlation between small
businesses’ ability to access credit and their ability to hire, finding that
the inability to secure financing may have led to 16% of small businesses
to reduce their number of employees and 10% to reduce employee
benefits.77 According to the same study, another 10% of small businesses
were unable to increase store inventory to meet existing demand due to
their inability to access credit.78

71. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25–26 (explaining that the small
business lending market is mostly made up of traditional financial institutions, credit unions,
and alternative lenders).
72. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25–26 (explaining that 11% of
employer firms and 13% of non-employer firms sought credit from credit unions, with 46%
of employer firms and 33% of non-employer firms being approved, and that 21% of employer
firms and 28% of non-employer firms sought credit from alternative lenders, with 62% and
45% being approved, respectively).
73. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (2015) (“In keeping with their business
strategy of building strong relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources
of credit for small businesses during the last two banking crises, compared with larger
banks.”).
74. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 19–20.
75. Testimony of Dan Sokolov Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight, and
Regs. of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 112th Cong. (2011).
76. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17 (“Access to financing is vitally
important in allowing businesses to grow. For small businesses financing not only provides
resources to smooth business cash flows for current operations, but also affords business
owners the opportunity to invest in business growth.”).
77. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17.
78. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF AN OVERBROAD IMPLEMENTATION OF S ECTION
1071
A.

The Importance of Community Banks to the Economy and Small
Businesses in Particular

Community banks play a crucial role in their local economies,
especially for small businesses in the community. 79 Small businesses’
unique financing needs often can only be met by community banks,
which employ methods 80 that take soft information—information that is
not generally available and is difficult to quantify—into consideration. 81
In contrast, larger financial institutions use traditional banking models
that are based exclusively on hard data, which limits their ability to meet
small business financing needs.82 Community banks’ vitality to small
business lending markets 83 enables these small businesses to contribute
to community development and local economic growth. 84 In addition to
small businesses, community banks also play a crucial role in providing
credit for local commercial real estate and agriculture interests.85
Community banks are particularly important in rural areas, where, in
some instances, they are the only banking office in the county, and
without which more than one-third of U.S. counties would have very
limited access to banking services. 86 Community banks are able to meet
79. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and
in their local communities.”).
80. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks pursue a “relationship
lending” strategy that gives them significant advantages in providing credit to small firms.”).
81. See Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks after DoddFrank, 90 IND. L.J. 179, 193 (2015) (explaining that the relationship-banking model builds
on longstanding customer relationships that give the banks richer access to “soft information”
about their customers).
82. See id. at 193 (explaining that in transactional banking hard information drives
performance and quantitative information like credit scores are used to make underwriting
decisions).
83. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (stating that the community banking sector
has consistently served as a dedicated and essential source of credit to small firms).
84. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and
in their local communities.”).
85. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 197 (“Community banks are absolutely vital to the
economic health of rural America and to the agricultural economy.”).
86. See Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 290 (“[M]ore than one-third of U.S. counties, with a
total population of over 16 million people, ‘would have very limited physical access to
mainstream banking services without the presence of community banks.’”) (quoting
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their clients’ needs in a more flexible manner 87 and provide credit to some
borrowers who could not obtain financing from other sources. 88
The most important provider of financing for small businesses
has historically been the banking industry, within which community
banks have “consistently served as a dedicated and essential source of
credit to small firms.”89 Currently, community banks provide about half
of all bank credit extended to small businesses, despite the fact that
community banks hold less than one-fifth of all banking industry assets.90
Community banks target small businesses as their primary customers, in
contrast to large banks, which seek out midsized and large companies. 91
Community banks are often the best source of financing for small
businesses. 92 The 2015 and 2016 Federal Reserve Small Business Credit
Surveys found that 46% of surveyed small businesses that applied for
credit did so at community banks.93 According to the Pepperdine Private
Capital Index, a 2016 survey of 1,888 small businesses, 22% of
businesses with revenues of less than $5 million that sought credit listed
community banks as their primary source of credit. 94 The Federal
Benjamin R. Backup, Community Bank Developments in 2012, 7 FDIC Q., No. 4 at 34 (2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2013-vol7-4/fdic-quarterly-vol7no4.pdf).
87. See Hester Pierce et al., Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, How are Small Banks
Faring Under Dodd-Frank? 14 (George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014),
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/how-are-small-banks-faring-under-dodd-frank
(explaining that community bankers believe that the relationship-banking model of banking
is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank, because the law favors the standardized lending criteria often
employed by larger banks and contains regulations that encourage or insist on standardization
of bank products and services).
88. See Tim Critchfield et al., Community Banks: Their Recent Past, Current
Performance, and Future Prospects, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 4 (2004), https://www.fdic.
gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/br16n34full.pdf (explaining that community banks are
often able to successfully lend to informationally opaque borrowers that have trouble
obtaining credit from large banks because they do not have long credit histories suitable for
credit-scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks).
89. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 288; See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra
note 2, at 24 (stating that small businesses continue to rely on traditional financial institutions,
defined as large banks and small banks, as their primary source of financing).
90. JEFFREY W. GUNTHER & KELLY KLEMME, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2012
ANNUAL REPORT: A LENDER FOR TOUGH TIMES (2012) http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/
fed/annual/2012/documents/ar12.pdf (finding that banks with under $10 billion “held 17
percent of industrywide banking assets as of June 2012—but they accounted for more than
half of the amount lent to small businesses.”).
91. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 291.
92. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that small businesses
are more likely to be able to obtain financing from community banks than large banks).
93. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24.
94. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25.
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Reserve Survey also found that employer small businesses—those with
at least one employee—and non-employer small businesses—those with
no employees—that applied for credit were 13% and 20% more likely to
be approved for financing from a small bank than from a large bank,
respectively. 95 These findings highlight a key advantage community
banks provide to small businesses—they will often provide credit to small
businesses that cannot obtain credit from large banks or other
intermediaries. 96
Community banks can also be the most reliable source of credit
for small businesses.97 During the financial crisis, larger banks
drastically decreased their lending to small businesses, whereas
community banks increased their share of the small business lending
market, despite their declining share of total banking industry assets in
the same time period.98 Community banks also outpaced large banks in
small business lending growth during the recovery. 99
The advantages provided by community banks in small-business
lending are primarily due to their use of “relationship banking,” rather
than the transactional banking strategy employed by large banks. 100 By
engaging in a “relationship banking” strategy, community banks are able
to meet their clients’ needs in a more flexible manner and provide credit
to some borrowers who could not obtain financing from other sources. 101
Transactional banking involves highly standardized products and relies
95. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25 (“Of those that applied, 67
percent of employer small businesses and 52 percent of non-employer businesses were
approved for financing from a small bank, while larger banks only approved 54 percent of
employer small businesses and 32 percent of non-employer small businesses that applied for
credit.”).
96. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2 (finding that small businesses were
more likely to be approved for financing by a small bank than a large bank).
97. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (“In keeping with their business strategy of
building strong relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources of credit
for small businesses during the last two banking crises, compared with larger banks.”).
98. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (explaining that during the most recent crisis,
larger banks cut back sharply on their small business lending, while community banks slightly
increased their share of the small business lending market between mid-2008 and mid-2012,
even though their share of total banking industry assets declined during that period).
99. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 293 (“Moreover, small business lending grew at a
significantly faster rate at community banks during 2013 and 2014, compared with the rest of
the banking industry.”).
100. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks pursue a “relationship
lending” strategy that gives them significant advantages in providing credit to small firms.”).
101. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2 (finding that small businesses were
more likely to be approved for financing by a small bank than a large bank).
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on “hard data” such as credit scores to make underwriting decisions. 102
Relationship banking, on the other hand, depends on longstanding
relationships with customers that give banks richer access to “soft
information” about their customers that cannot be easily quantified. 103
Community banks utilize this soft information to afford their employees
more discretion in making lending decisions 104 in ways that better serve
many borrowers than with a purely quantitative strategy. 105
Community banks can offer more personalized services to their
customers due to their longstanding business and personal
relationships. 106 Community bank managers generally have long tenures
and are often deeply involved in their communities, so they have superior
ability to assess and monitor local firms. 107 Relationship banking can be
very beneficial to small businesses, because many such firms are
“informationally opaque,” meaning they do not have long credit histories
suitable for credit scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large
banks, and community banks can overcome this challenge by utilizing
soft information. 108 Utilization of relationship banking strategies awards
community banks with a degree of flexibility not available to large banks,
which rely on highly-standardized transactional banking strategies. 109
102. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (explaining that “in transactional banking hard
information drives performance” and quantitative information like credit scores are used to
make underwriting decisions).
103. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (explaining that the relationship-banking model
builds on longstanding customer relationships that give the banks richer access to “soft
information” about their customers).
104. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“Computer models may be used to enhance
underwriting, but more authority is given to community bank employees to make lending
decisions.”).
105. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“[S]tudies have shown that many borrowers,
particularly small businesses, farmers, and individuals, are better served by relationship
banking than by the transactional-banking model.”).
106. Adam R. Lewis, Note, North Carolina Community Banks: Survival Strategies for
Turbulent Times, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 353 (2013) (“Community banks know their
customers well and are able to offer more
personalized service and advice.”).
107. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks have a superior ability to
assess and monitor local firms because their managers and loan officers generally have long
tenures in their positions and are deeply involved in the life of their communities.”).
108. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that the strength of community
banks stems from their ability to successfully lend to “informationally opaque” borrowers that
have trouble obtaining credit from large banks because they do not have “long credit histories
suitable for credit-scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks . . . .”).
109. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 347 (“[B]ig banks provide credit to small
businesses primarily through standardized, ‘cookie cutter’ loan programs, including business
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Unfortunately, community bankers feel that certain parts of Dodd-Frank,
including Section 1071, threaten the relationship banking model, thus
harming borrowers like small businesses that depend on relationship
banking. 110
B.

Compliance Costs and Competitive Environment

The compliance costs associated with Section 1071 could prove
to be too burdensome for community banks and force them to exit the
market by limiting their access to credit, which would be very harmful to
women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses that the rule was
enacted to protect.111 About half of small businesses turn to community
banks to apply for credit, where they were 13% to 20% more likely to be
approved, and 22% of these small businesses depend on community
banks as their primary source of credit. 112 Also, these small businesses
would be left without access to the same quality of banking that
community banks have historically provided through the process of
relationship banking, 113 and in some cases would be left without access
to credit at all.114 Even for community banks that would not fail, they
may not be able to practice relationship banking to the same level as
before due to the standardized nature of Section 1071’s requirements. 115

credit cards and equipment leases, which (1) rely on impersonal credit-scoring techniques and
other automated technologies and (2) enable many of the resulting loans to be securitized.”).
110. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 14 (explaining that community bankers believe
that the relationship-banking model of banking is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank).
111. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 345 (explaining that community banks face compliance
cost threats and a great number of banks with between $100 million and $250 million in assets
have failed in recent years).
112. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25 (“Of those that applied, 67
percent of employer small businesses and 52 percent of non-employer businesses were
approved for financing from a small bank, while larger banks only approved 54 percent of
employer small businesses and 32 percent of non-employer small businesses that applied for
credit. According to the Pepperdine Index, a comparable small bank statistic suggests about
22 percent of surveyed businesses with revenues less than $5 million that sought credit listed
community banks as their primary source of credit.”).
113. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“[S]tudies have shown that many borrowers,
particularly small businesses, farmers, and individuals, are better served by relationship
banking than by the transactional-banking model.”).
114. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that community banks have
unique abilities to successfully lend to borrowers that have trouble obtaining credit from large
banks).
115. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 14 (explaining that community bankers believe
that the relationship-banking model of banking is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank, because the
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In order to understand the impact of legislation like Section 1071
on community banks, it is necessary to understand the current economic
environment in which they operate. Two important factors in the
community bank market are competitive pressures presented by large
banks and compliance costs presented by recent legislation and
regulation. 116 These competitive pressures and burdensome compliance
costs are contributing factors to the trend of many community banks
failing, merging together to reduce costs and achieve a certain scale, or
being acquired by larger financial institutions. 117 This trend is shrinking
the market and leading some in the industry to predict that community
banks will eventually disappear entirely. 118
Competitive pressure in the lending marketplace disrupts the
economic viability of community banks.119 Various statutes passed in the
1990s120 deregulated the banking industry and contributed to a trend of
consolidation.121 This resulted in a large concentration of power and
assets in a few big banks, which created significant competitive problems
for community banks.122 Today, the six largest bank holding companies
in America hold 67% of all bank holding company assets.123 As the
law favors the standardized lending criteria often employed by larger banks and contains
regulations that encourage or insist on standardization of bank products and services).
116. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 225 (discussing the competitive disadvantages faced by
community banks and how they will be further exacerbated by new compliance costs).
117. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–51 (discussing recent community bank failures,
acquisitions, and mergers).
118. See Anthony Gaeta, Jr., The Future of Community Banking, 20 N.C. BANKING INST.
1, 1 (2016) (“In my conclusion, I stated that ‘so alas, I see the demise and eventual
extinguishment of true small town community banks.’”).
119. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 225 (discussing the competitive disadvantages faced by
community banks and how they will be further exacerbated by new compliance costs).
120. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 336–37 (explaining that Riegle-Neal, by lifting the
Bank Holding Company Act’s prohibition on interstate banking, allowed large banks to
establish branches in other states, significantly increasing the number of potential competitors
for community banks; then further explaining how community banks’ competitive problems
were exacerbated by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed GlassSteagall and allowed bank holding companies to grow larger through acquisition of
companies engaged in financial in nature activities, further increasing competition to
community banks and endangering them).
121. See Lewis, supra note 106 at 336–37 (describing how Congress passed a number of
laws in the 1990s that deregulated the banking industry and opened the door for large financial
institutions to grow even larger and to compete directly with community banks).
122. See Brynne Krause, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: How Increased Regulation Has Given Large Banks an Artificial Competitive Edge, 83
UMKC L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2015) (stating that the six largest banks in America hold 67% of
all banking industry assets).
123. Id.
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biggest financial institutions merge to become even larger, they are able
to absorb new costs such as compliance costs more easily than smaller
banks, making it harder for community banks to compete. 124 During the
2008 financial crisis, many of these larger banks received government
assistance, while some smaller banks were allowed to fail. 125 This created
a perception that large banks are safer because of government backing in
times of crisis, causing consumers to flee the smaller banks that may not
receive such assistance. 126
In addition to competitive pressures, community banks have
faced growing compliance costs over the past two decades that some
banks have found to be too much of a burden to continue operating. 127
After already struggling to comply with previous enactments, 128
community banks were hit with the largest imposition of compliance
costs that they had ever faced in the form of Dodd-Frank. 129 Critics agree
that these new significant compliance costs place community banks at a
further competitive disadvantage. 130 A George Mason University survey
found that community banks that responded have had increased
compliance costs since Dodd-Frank was passed, with many respondents
reporting that they would have to hire one to two additional employees to
meet the statutory requirements. 131 In response to a survey conducted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 84% of community banks reported

124. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 342 (explaining that larger banking entities may have
a compliance department or in-house counsel in addition to at least one law firm on retainer,
enabling them to better adapt to compliance costs, but community banks usually lack such
resources).
125. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342.
126. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342.
127. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 345 (explaining that community banks face compliance
cost threats and a great number of banks with between $100 million and $250 million in assets
have failed in recent years).
128. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) was the first major compliance hurdle
faced by community banks in recent years, passed in response to the failure of Enron and
related scandals in the early 2000s, SOX imposed new reporting requirements that placed a
tremendous and disproportionate burden on publicly held community banks, decreasing
profitability and their ability to compete. Sarbanes-Oxley Essential Information, SOXONLINE, http://www.sox-online.com/sarbanes-oxley-basics/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018);
Lewis, supra note 106, at 337–38.
129. See Regina F. Burch, Financial Regulatory Reform Post-Financial Crisis:
Unintended Consequences for Small Businesses, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012)
(stating that Dodd-Frank is “the most sweeping financial industry reform legislation since the
Great Depression”).
130. Marsh, supra note 81, at 226.
131. Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 34.
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that compliance requirements were the most significant challenge they
faced.132 Whereas larger banks tend to have compliance departments or
in-house counsel to work on these compliance requirements, community
banks usually lack such resources, increasing the difficulty of adapting to
new regulations.133 “Outsourcing much of this regulatory burden is
expensive and self-staffing by the community banks is even more
impractical from an expense standpoint.”134
The competitive pressures and compliance costs currently faced
by community banks have led to a trend of consolidation and bank
failures.135 According to the same George Mason University study, the
number of community banks has shrunk 14% since Dodd-Frank was
passed, and 27% since 2000.136 Since 2008, 555 banks have failed, a
great number of which were banks with between $100 million and $250
million in assets.137 In North Carolina alone, Waccamaw Bank, Blue
Ridge Savings Bank, The Bank of Asheville, Cooperative Bank, and
Cape Fear Bank have all failed in recent years. 138 Some reports, however,
express doubts as to whether Dodd-Frank is the main cause of this
consolidation.139
In the face of potential failure, community banks have a few
options.140 Specifically, they can merge with other community banks or
seek to be acquired by another institution. 141 Currently, bank holding
132. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY DIV. OF SUPERVISION AND RISK MGMT., SURVEY

COMMUNITY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (August 2011), https://www.kansascityfed.o
rg/publicat/banking/surveycommbanks/11BankResults.pdf.
133. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342.
134. Gaeta, Jr., supra note 118, at 4.
135. Marsh, supra note 81, at 185.
136. Hester Pierce & Stephen Matteo Miller, Small Banks By the Numbers, 2000-2014,
MERCATUS CENTER (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/small-banksnumbers-2000-2014.
137. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILED BANK LIST, http://fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (covering bank failures between Jan. 1, 2000 and Jan.
3, 2018).
138. List of Failed Banks 2009–2017, BANKRATE (Jan. 10, 2017), http://
www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/failed-banks-north-carolina.aspx.
139. Deena Zaidi, Is Dodd-Frank Really Killing Community Banks?, THESTREET (Nov. 3,
2015, 12:17 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13348453/1/is-dodd-frank-really-killingcommunity-banks.html; See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE
PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY BANKS OVER TIME 1, 3 (2016), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160810_cea_community_banks.pdf (Aug. 2016) (explaining that bank consolidation is a
long-running trend that has been occurring since long before the passage of Dodd-Frank).
140. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49.
141. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49.
OF
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companies are reluctant to acquire community banks in a market that is
saturated with banks with assets in the billions. 142 The recent success of
community bank mergers suggests that merging may be the best option
for struggling community banks.143 The bottom line is that the bigger the
entity, the more likely it is that it can absorb increased compliance
costs. 144 The data from 2011 shows that banks with under $250 million
in assets failed at three times the rate of those over that threshold. 145 It
seems clear that in the current environment, struggling community banks
either merge or are acquired, while some fail, all of which decrease the
number of community banks in the market, disproportionately affecting
small businesses. 146
C.

The Impact of Community Banks Exiting the Small Business
Lending Market

The number of community banks has decreased over recent years
due to competitive pressures and compliance costs, and will continue to
do so as more compliance costs are imposed on these already-struggling
institutions.147 A 2013 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis study
projected that nearly “[13%] of the banks with assets less than $50 million
would become unprofitable” when the staff is increased by one half of a
person.148 Such staff increases have come to fruition according to the
George Mason University study, which found that the median compliance
staff of the banks surveyed have already had to hire an additional
employee because of Dodd-Frank.149 Thus, it would not be surprising if
these banks had to hire more employees as the remainder of Dodd-

142. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346.
143. Lewis, supra note 106, at 334.
144. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 342 (explaining that, whereas larger banks tend to have

compliance departments or in-house counsel to combat compliance costs, community banks
usually lack such resources, making it more difficult to adapt to new regulations).
145. Bank Failures in Brief, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/bank/2011/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
146. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49.
147. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49.
148. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF ADDITIONAL
REGULATION ON COMMUNITY BANKS 1, 6 (2013).
149. See Pierce et al., supra note 87 (“The median number of compliance staff for the
banks in our survey increased from one to two, and more than a quarter of respondents plan
to add another compliance person.”).
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Frank—including Section 1071—is implemented, possibly making them
unprofitable. 150
The recent community bank failures have inflicted serious harm
on small businesses and communities. 151 Prominent economists have
observed that the community bank failures have had a disproportionate
impact on small businesses.152 Similar bank failures “between 2008 and
2010 had significant adverse impacts on income, employment,
compensation growth, and poverty in the counties where the failures
occurred.”153 Through relationship banking, community banks are able
to provide credit to some small businesses that cannot obtain affordable
credit elsewhere. 154 This was apparent in some areas where “many small
businesses could not find any type of external funding—or were forced
to rely on much more expensive credit from nonbank lenders” because
local community banks failed or were unable to continue providing loans
to their established small firm customers. 155
A further decline in community banks would threaten small
businesses, consumers, and local communities.156 There is a wellestablished link between small businesses and community banks,
explaining why small firms, consumers, and local communities suffer
when community banks do not have a competitive presence in local
markets.157 The main impact of community bank failures on communities
will be the decreased availability of funding for small businesses. 158
Thus, the declining role of community banks as providers of credit, which
reflects the consolidation of the banking system, is probably a significant
factor in the downtrend in the share of credit provided to small

150. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 35 (showing that compliance burdens of DoddFrank force small banks to hire additional employees).
151. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294.
152. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294 (statement of Mark Gentler) (“The demise of
local lenders has inflicted a disproportionate blow on small enterprises.”) (statement of Mark
Zandi) (“Small bank failures matter a lot to the communities in which they operate, especially
in non-urban areas. Small banks are key to small businesses.”).
153. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294.
154. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that the strength of community
banks stems from their ability to utilize a relationship banking model to successfully lend to
“informationally opaque” borrowers).
155. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 295.
156. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298.
157. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298.
158. Lewis, supra note 106, at 354.
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businesses. 159 A recent study found that small businesses “were less
likely to obtain credit from banks” and “were likely to receive lower
amounts of credit” in markets dominated by the largest banks. 160 These
large banks also charge substantially higher fees on deposit account
services compared to community banks, which probably contributes to
community banks’ much higher rates of customer satisfaction and a
higher level of citizen trust.161 Small businesses suffer when community
banks fail, and because small businesses are so vital to their communities,
their failures can cause local economies to struggle. 162
As community banks exit the market, other entities will fill in to
meet their customers’ banking needs, but it is doubtful whether they can
do so as effectively as community banks. 163 Small businesses would
probably have more trouble obtaining financing with these alternative
lenders.164 Credit unions have very conservative lending standards and
big banks do not participate in relationship banking, so even if these small
businesses are able to obtain credit, it almost certainly would not come
with the same level of flexibility as provided by relationship banking. 165
Since relationship banking can sometimes be the only lending technique
that affords informationally opaque borrowers the ability to obtain
financing,166 “[m]any of the loans small business owners depend on to
start new businesses, or expand existing businesses, will not be available
if community banks disappear” because credit unions, big banks, and
other alternative sources of credit do not consider such factors. 167

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298.
Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298.
Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 299.
Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1, at X.
See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“Undoubtedly, other entities will fill in to meet
the banking needs of most general customers.”).
164. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“However, it may be more difficult for some
borrowers to be approved for credit.”).
165. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“Credit unions, as non-profit and tax-exempt
entities, have very conservative lending standards, and big banks are not willing to provide
“reputational lending” to the same extent as community banks.”).
166. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that community banks are more
able to successfully lend to “informationally opaque” borrowers that have trouble obtaining
credit from large banks because they do not have long credit histories suitable for creditscoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks).
167. Lewis, supra note 106, at 354.
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V. EXEMPTING COMMUNITY BANKS WITH LESS THAN $50 MILLION IN
ASSETS
Those in the community banking industry have made a
resounding plea to the CFPB to exempt community banks from the
implementation of Section 1071.168 There is precedent for the CFPB
exempting smaller financial institutions from reporting requirements. 169
For example, in 2013, the CFPB exempted mortgage servicers that
service 5,000 or fewer mortgages from its new Mortgage Servicing
Rules.170 The CFPB has also exempted small banks and credit unions
from its payday lending rule. 171 The exemption would also fit within the
larger emerging regulatory scheme of tailoring regulations to bank
size. 172
The CFPB should not, however, exempt all community banks, as
overbroad exclusions could potentially render Section 1071
ineffective. 173 Since community banks occupy around half of the small
business lending market, an outright exclusion would leave data on half

168. Comment letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2017-0011-0630
; Thomas, supra note 50.
169. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING
FINAL RULES 14 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_complianceguide_2013-mortgage-servicing-rules.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
REGULATION X AND REGULATION Z] (explaining the exemption for small servicers from
certain parts of the Mortgage Servicing Rules); see also Jeff Bater, Small Banks, Credit
Unions Win Carve-Out in CFPB Payday Rule, [2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 193
(October 6, 2017) [hereinafter Bater, Carve-Out] (explaining that the CFPB’s final rule on
payday lending will exempt lenders who make 2,500 or fewer short-term or balloon payment
loans per year and derive less than 10% of their revenue from such loans).
170. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REGULATION X AND REGULATION Z, supra note
169, at 14 (“Servicers that qualify as small servicers are exempt from certain parts of the
Mortgage Servicing Rules.”).
171. See Bater, Carve-Out, supra note 169 (explaining the CFPB’s exemption for lenders
who make 2,500 or fewer short-term or balloon payment loans per year and derive less than
10% of their revenue from such loans from its final rule on payday lending).
172. See Jeanna Smialek, Yellen Says Fed Working on Tailoring Regulations to Bank Size,
[2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 192 (October 5, 2017) (explaining that the Federal Reserve
Board has been working to ensure that banking regulations are tailored to the size of the
financial institution.).
173. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. 22318 (May 10, 2017) (“In order to achieve this statutory purpose, the Bureau believes
the section 1071 data should cover an extensive share of the market and contain enough
flexibility to analyze different market segments.”).
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of the loans that Section 1071 inaccessible to the CFPB, limiting the
effectiveness of the rule.174 Without the ability to monitor these loans,
the CFPB cannot achieve their stated goal of facilitating enforcement of
fair lending laws on this half of small business loans. 175 It is also
important to keep in mind that while relationship banking has many great
advantages, it also allows a great deal of discretion, which may open the
door for bank employees’ inherent biases to impact lending decisions—
either intentionally or unintentionally. 176 Also, without the data from half
of the small business lending market, the CFPB would have an
incomplete data set upon which it could attempt to accomplish its stated
goal of enabling “communities, governmental entities, and creditors to
identify business and community development needs and opportunities
of women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses.”177 While it is
not necessary to possess data for every small business loan to draw
conclusions about the small business lending market, it certainly leads to
more accurate decisions if at least some of the data from community bank
loans were included. 178 The National Community Reinvestment
Coalition (“NCRC”) issued a white paper urging the CFPB to take an
expansive approach in developing its final rule, and not to create
exemptions that would exclude “significant numbers of financial
institutions.”179 The NCRC fears that overbroad exclusions could
“obfuscate or result in market distortions,” impair the ability to engage in

174. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (stating that community banks make up about
half of the small business lending market).
175. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a) (2016).
176. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“Computer models may be used to enhance
underwriting, but more authority is given to community bank employees to make lending
decisions.”).
177. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a).
178. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. 22318, 22319 (May 10, 2017) (“In order to achieve this statutory purpose, the Bureau
believes the section 1071 data should cover an extensive share of the market and contain
enough flexibility to analyze different market segments.”).
179. See NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., SMALL BUSINESS LOAN DATA:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU FOR IMPLEMENTING
SECTION 1071 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
OF 2010 33 (2014), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2
014/08/recommendations-to-cfpb-on-small-business-loan-data.pdf (“The ability to engage in
fair lending enforcement is impaired if significant numbers of financial institutions are
exempted.”).
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fair lending enforcement, and constrain the public’s ability to determine
unmet needs. 180
The most effective solution is to implement a size-based
exclusion for community banks with less than $50 million in assets—
those that need compliance relief most. 181 While most size-based
exclusions are somewhat arbitrary, such an exemption is a bright line rule
that is easy to implement since the only information needed is the value
of the bank’s assets, and $50 million in assets is a logical line to draw
because it is the threshold at which banks would start to become
unprofitable due to additional compliance costs. 182 This would provide a
more efficient process for accomplishing the stated goal of facilitating
enforcement of fair lending laws, without imposing too heavy of a
compliance burden on those community banks most at risk of being
unable to meet the demands of Section 1071. 183 The dataset of
information on small business loans would still be incomplete, but the
missing portion would not be nearly as vast with only the smallest
community banks being excluded. 184 This would enable the public to
draw more accurate conclusions about the small business lending market
to determine unmet needs.185 Overall, providing an exemption for
community banks with under $50 million in assets would strike a good
balance between limiting onerous compliance costs that could put

180. Id. at 16.
181. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF M INNEAPOLIS, supra note 148, at 2 (finding that many

banks with less than $50 million in assets become unprofitable when forced to hire additional
employees).
182. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 148, at 2 (“By way of example,
we find that the median reduction in profitability for banks with less than $50 million in assets
is 14 basis points if they have to increase staff by one half of a person; the reduction is 45
basis points if they increase staffing by two employees. The former increase in staff leads an
additional 6 percent of banks this size to become unprofitable, while the latter increase leads
an additional 33 percent to become unprofitable.”).
183. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a) (2016).
184. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 22319 (explaining the importance of collecting enough data to cover an extensive
share of the small business lending market).
185. See NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., supra note 179, at 16 (explaining that
overbroad exclusions could “obfuscate or result in market distortions,” impair the ability to
engage in fair lending enforcement, and constrain the public’s ability to determine unmet
needs).
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community banks in danger of failure and providing overbroad
exclusions that could potentially render the rule ineffective. 186
A.

An Exemption Would Reduce Significant Compliance Costs
Imposed by Section 1071

Section 1071 imposes vast new compliance costs on community
banks and, in some cases, may even lead to their failures.187 Community
banks already face heavy competitive pressures from larger banks, and
imposing more heavy compliance costs places them at an even greater
competitive disadvantage when the larger banks are more able to adapt to
these costs.188 The need to hire even one additional person to comply
with the law could be the death knell to a community bank. 189 While the
precise impact of implementing Section 1071 in a broad form is not yet
clear, it is not difficult to project that a rule requiring extensive
information gathering, recordkeeping, and reporting could force
community banks to hire additional employees to comply with these
requirements. 190 In the RFI, the CFPB even recognized the potential for
Section 1071 to be burdensome to community banks and stated a goal of
minimizing its burden to both the industry and the Bureau.191
Much of the concern stems from the heterogeneous nature of
small business lending, which would be incompatible with collecting

186. See NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., supra note 179, at 16 (explaining how
providing exclusions for too large of a segment of the market could result in market
distortions, limiting the usefulness of the information).
187. See Burch, supra note 129, at 413 (stating that Dodd-Frank is “the most sweeping
financial industry reform legislation since the Great Depression”).
188. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 342 (explaining that community banks usually do not
have compliance departments similar to those at larger banks, making it more difficult to
adapt to new regulations).
189. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF M INNEAPOLIS, supra note 148 (finding that “[thirteen]
percent of the banks with assets less than $50 million would become unprofitable” when the
staff is increased by one half of a person).
190. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1071, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2016) (describing the expansive information gathering,
recordkeeping, and reporting required by the Section 1071).
191. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed.
Reg. 22318 (May 10, 2017) (“The Bureau is interested in exploring potential ways to
implement Section 1071 in a balanced manner with a goal of providing timely data with the
highest potential for achieving the statutory objectives, while minimizing burden to both
industry and the Bureau.”).
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mass data.192 A GAO report conducted prior to the enactment of Section
1071 analyzed the potential costs of the kind of data collection required
by Section 1071.193 The report warned that such data collection and
reporting could impose major compliance burdens, with potential costs
including information system integration, employee training, and
compliance costs.194
The costs of complying would likely be similar to those of a
similar reporting regime that has been in place for decades under the
HMDA.195 The HMDA requires certain depository institutions to
disclose similar data points to those required by Section 1071, including
the race, gender, and income level of all mortgage applicants. 196 Also,
one purpose of the HMDA—to make the data collected publicly available
to be used to identify potentially discriminatory lending patterns and
practices197—is similar to that of Section 1071. 198 The CFPB, since the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, also has HMDA rulemaking authority. 199
In October 2015, the CFPB issued a final rule regarding the HMDA,
which introduced sweeping changes and imposed additional compliance

192. See Comment letter from Barry Mills, Senior Regulatory Advisor, Am. Bankers
Ass’n, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2017-0011-0635 (“Small business
lending at banks is highly individualized, and underwriting and loan pricing depend on many
heterogeneous variables that are inherently unsuitable for mass-data fair lending analysis.”).
193. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FAIR LENDING: DATA LIMITATIONS AND THE
FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE CHALLENGE FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 27 (July 2009) (analyzing potential costs of data collections in
connection to fair lending enforcement).
194. See id. (“These potential costs included information system integration, employee
training, and compliance costs.”).
195. See Mike Ferullo, Application Data Not Required from Banks Until Rules Are
Written, CFPB Counsel Says, [2011] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 70 (May 11, 2017) (“A
similar reporting regime has been in place for decades under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act, which covers residential mortgages and home improvement loans.”).
196. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES : CASES AND MATERIALS 429 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that the HMDA
requires certain depository institutions to disclose race, gender and income levels of mortgage
applicants).
197. Id.
198. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a) (2016). (“The purpose of [Section 1071] is to facilitate
enforcement of fair lending laws and enable communities, governmental entities, and
creditors to identify business and community development needs and opportunities of womenowned, minority-owned, and small businesses.”).
199. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 196, at 429.
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burdens.200 With the CFPB increasing regulatory requirements, many
institutions have had to “implement more robust compliance
management systems,” with costs potentially impacting their ability to
offer quality products and services.201 Due to the new HMDA
requirements, institutions will have to consider new information
technology challenges, compliance personnel appointments or engage
third-party vendors, and additional privacy risks. 202
As costly as HMDA compliance has been for financial
institutions, Section 1071 would likely be even more burdensome due to
key differences in mortgage-lending and small business lending
practices.203 Whereas mortgage lending can be a formulaic process, small
business lending typically relies on more complicated standards. 204 For
small business lending, there is usually no standardized application
process, as each small business has unique credit needs tailored to its own
distinctive characteristics.205 Thus, current practices in the small business
lending market would not conform to standard data collection efforts. 206
This is especially true for community banks, which, as the
Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”) highlights in its
response to the RFI, could face a disproportionate burden of the
mandate.207 According to the ICBA, community banks would have to
implement an entirely new small business lending process to
accommodate Section 1071, straying from their nuanced and unique
process and revert to a homogeneous process that could drive small
business credit out of small banks and reduce access to credit for small
businesses with unique credit needs.208
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 1071 seeks to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws
and provide a means for the public to determine unmet needs in the small
200. Anthony Sharett, CFPB HMDA Expansion Delivers New Challenges to Banks and
Lenders, 35 BANKING & FIN. REP. 1, 3 (2016).
201. Id. at 1.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Quaadman, supra note 168, at 7; Thomas, supra note 50, at 13.
204. Quaadman, supra note 168, at 7.
205. Thomas, supra note 50, at 5.
206. Thomas, supra note 50, at 5.
207. Thomas, supra note 50, at 7.
208. Thomas, supra note 50, at 5.
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business lending market by requiring financial institutions to compile,
maintain, and report information concerning credit applications made by
women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses. 209 These are very
important goals, because of the crucial role small businesses play in our
economy. 210 However, too broad of an imposition of heavy compliance
costs by the implementation of the rule could be self-defeating and leave
these small businesses worse off by putting community banks at risk of
failure, thereby restricting access to credit for those businesses. 211 The
best way to achieve the goals of Section 1071 while not imposing undue
compliance burdens on community banks would be to provide an
exemption from the rule’s requirements for community banks with under
$50 million in assets.212
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1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2016).
210. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. B UREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that small
businesses are vital in fostering community development and fueling economic growth, they
are the primary source of income for many owners and employees, and when they are
successful, their communities create positive trends in local incomes, employment rates, and
poverty rates).
211. See supra Part IV.
212. See supra Part V.
*I would like to thank my soon-to-be wife, Sydney, and my family, to whom I owe everything
for their support and inspiration and without whom I would not be where I am today. I would
also like to thank Ethan Trotz, Farhayal Zubair, and Professor Lissa Broome for their
thoughtful comments and guidance throughout the editing process.

